Archive for Bad Idea of the Day
Bad Attitude of the Day: Would-Be President Edition
Posted by: | CommentsJohn Quincy Adams is pretty much uniformly recognized as the biggest asshole to win the presidency. He was brainy all right, but a complete tool when it came to dealing with people. When he was sworn in, he tossed a bunch of way cool ideas over at Congress and basically said, “Here, morons. See if you’re smart enough to recognize how great these ideas are. And don’t forget, if you think otherwise, you’re just proving how retarded you are, and really, why do I even bother, since we already know from square one what pack of world-class cretins you are.” (Shown above is the famous presidential painting “Take it Or Leave It, Chumps.”) Oddly enough, the reaction on Capitol Hill was to instantly send the proposal to the Fuck You Subcommittee. Things went steadily down hill from there. [As for the use of the word, "retard," bear in mind that those were simpler days. They also referred to people with dyslexia by the technical term "stupid."]
And just to show that this attitude of his was not something he had to work on, here’s a snippet from a letter he wrote upon entering Harvard. For the previous five years he’d live with his father in Europe while the latter was engage in diplomatic work, so JQA now considered himself smarter than the rubes teaching at Harvard. This situation made him feel that it was “hard for me to submit to” what he considered the haughty faculty. Nonetheless, he believed that deferring to the authority of these idiots:
may be of use to me, as it mortifys my Vanity, and if anything, in the world, can teach me humility it will be to see myself subjected to the commands of a Person that I despise.
Talk about your lose-lose attitude! His self-indulgent arrogance means that he thinks he’s smarter than his teachers, yet he’s willing to give in to their erroneous views because such “humility” will make him a better person.
You know, the only bigger asshole president is generally considered to be JQA’s own dad, John Adams, so you can see that JQA came about his passive-aggresssive smugness honest. But you’d think that the voters might have learned better the first time around. Seemingly, not. And it doesn’t take a lot of empathy to see why Andrew Jackson (who beat JQA in the popular vote in 1824 but lost out to him when Congress decided the election) absolutely loathed the man.
Actually, there’s no need to cite Jackson. Everybody hated John Q. Adams, including the man himself. With good reason!
Wait, What?: Education Funding Edition
Posted by: | CommentsThe Nude York Times had an op-ep piece today by some idiot writer on education for its magazine that bewails the fact that the the senate subcommittee on education cut 90% from Obama’s proposed budget for something called the Promise Neighbors initiative. What the fuck is that? you probably wondering. Good question! It seems that in 2007 Prez. Barry said “he would help create in 20 cities across the country a new kind of support system for disadvantaged children, paid for with a mix of private and public money. In a single distressed neighborhood in each city, Mr. Obama explained, high-quality schools would be integrated into a network of early-childhood programs, parenting classes, health clinics and other social services, all focused on improving educational outcomes for poor children.”
Ah, you’re saying, it’s a way of promising vast amounts of money to boondoggles for the president’s fellow “community organizers.” Why ever the senate would not wish to provide such promising money is a mystery to us all. After all, it’s all made up money, so what the hell? The Department of Education probably loses $210 million on a regular basis every week or so.
But no. The senate subcommittee decided that just chucking a bunch of money on completely wacky shit that people just come up with isn’t a good idea. But this sort of hide-bound thinking that thwarts the innovations for which community organizers are so famous just won’t do. At least not in the mind of the op-ed idiot writer. He begins by asking the question:
How much evidence does the government need before trying something new in the troubled realm of public education? Should there be airtight proof that a pioneering program works before we commit federal money to it — or is it sometimes worth investing in promising but unproven innovations?
Now, you might think that proposing to chuck hundreds of millions of dollars at idiocy cooked up by community organizers “unproven innovations” was a hard argument to make, but that’s the sort specious sophistry open-minded thinking we’ve all come to expect in the country’s rag-of-record. So, how do we go about proving that it’s a good idea to spend a bunch of money that you have no idea whether it’s going to work or not?
Well, first you give anecdotal “evidence” to suggest that two programs may have success at turning the “disadvantaged” into would-be Einsteins. Now, this “evidence” consists rather more of assertion than demonstration, but let’s leave that quibble aside. You then go on to ask rhetorically?
So, at this moment of uncertainty and experimentation, should the federal government wait, as critics of Promise Neighborhoods suggest, until ironclad evidence for one big solution exists?
Well, no. But perhaps it might not be overly dogmatic to suggest that spending $210 million on shit before you actually prove that it does work might not be unreasonable.
Oh, but Mr. Idiot Genius is onto your tricks! Before you can start contesting the specious way that question was phrased, he’s got an easier one for you:
Or should it create a competitive research-and-development marketplace to make bets on innovations, the way the government did during the space race and in the early days of the Internet, and allow the most successful strategies to rise to the top?
“Oh, fuck yeah! Did you say $210 million? We should be spending like $210 billion on competitive research-and-developmental market placely bets on innovation, just like the way that they threw tons of money at NASA and the NEA and said, ‘Hey, we don’t care what you do with this money, just stick some guys on the moon by next Tuesday!’ And it was totally wicked the way that worked out, with Verner von Brown on one team and Jasper Pollock on the other, and they were shooting up test rockets and splattering moon paint on canvases in high-pressure competition, and, long story short, the Nazis beat out the abstract painters, but damned if they didn’t get Neil Armstrong and Andres Serrano on the moon. Maybe not by the following Tuesday, but Thursday at the latest!”
Or not. So, okay, maybe the argument for the efficacy of semi-proven programs wasn’t fully convincing. Will that stop our intrepid idiot op-edder? Not on your life! He’s got another argument to make.
In order to advocate spending money on shit when you don’t know whether it will work, he makes a clever argument ex stultitudine (for those not in the know, that’s a Latin from medieval scholasticism signifying the method of logical argument based on idiocy; it’s literally an argument “from stupidity”). To show that it’s a better idea to spend money on this innovative stuff, he demonstrates the stupidity of previous government programs. Specifically, the government has been spending billions on the Head Start program, and according to the idiot genius, it’s all been a waste. But does that stop the wicked senate subcommittee? Not on your life! They’re throwing vast amounts more at it. And in fact, since the program’s inception forty years ago, its budget has increased by 500000 % in inflation-adjusted dollars, or something like that. (Truth be told, Keyser was laughing too hard at this point to keep the numbers straight. Or was that crying?)
Anyway, this useless, dysfunctional program has been allotted by those mean senators $21 billion, whereas this innovative crap has been docked 90% of its measly request for only 1% of the benighted Head Start’s budget. Now, the idiot might ask what’s the harm of squandering another 1%, but he chooses not to go that route. Instead, here’s the peroratory summation of his argument:
Of course, the fact that Congress spends billions of dollars each year on unproven programs does not itself argue that the government should start spending hundreds of millions of new dollars on new unproven programs. But it does undercut the argument that federal education dollars should be reserved only for conclusively proven initiatives.
At this point, even Keyser’s fabled bonhomie began to give out. Not even Thomas Aquinas on a bad day could tolerate a shoddy argument like that. First, we’re equating an ex hypothsi failed program with an “unproven” one, so that we can talk about Head Start and this new shit as if they’re equivalent. And the argument seems to be that if we’re spending vast amounts on shit that doesn’t work, what’s the harm in wasting some more? And what’s with the final sentence about the fact that money is wasted on demonstrably wasteful programs “undercutting” the argument that money should only go for “conclusively proven initiatives.” Hey, dude. In case you hadn’t noticed, you just said that one of the most touted government programs in the area where you’d advocating more money for completely unproven sit is itself a fraud. And you expect us to believe that this time you’ve got it right, unlike all the thousands of programs along these lines in the past decades that have consumed vast amounts of money without seeming to have accomplished much of anything?
This sounds reminiscent of the cry of the die-hard Western commies, who would say, “Yeah, communism has proven to be a failure in Russia and China and Cuba and anyplace else where they’ve tried it. But that’s because it wasn’t real communism. Just give us a chance, and this time it’ll work like a dream!” Yeah, right. Idiots.
Anyway, how can anyone use expressions like “completely proven” in such contexts, unless he means “completely proven” to be a failure? Surely, the government should spend billions of dollars only on things that are in fact “proven” to work, and to argue that because the government’s previous spending initiatives have been failures, it’s necessary to chuck the money at new shit because, hey, it can’t be any worse than the old shit, right? surely has to be the mark of a madman.
Or a leftist, which is basically saying the same thing. As Keyser has noted before, feelings are what counts for people like this. Logic really isn’t their strong suit.
The Uselessness of Economics: Historical Edition
Posted by: | CommentsThe more you read about today’s economic problems, the more apparent it becomes that economists have no idea what they’re talking about. Just read that idiot Krugman. “The $1.5 trillion spent so far to stimulate our way out of the doldrums just wasn’t good enough. Solution: spending more money we don’t have. What could go wrong!” And of course one of the causes of today’s problems is the craziness of neo-monetarist foolishness flogged by guys like Greenspan. The notion was that markets solve everything by themselves, so all you have to do is keep the money supply constant and bob’s your uncle. Prosperity for everyone! Of course, the problem is that the banking sector isn’t a free market, the banks were able to game the regulators and regulations, and Greenspan was watching the wrong indication of money supply. Whatever the details, the broad criticism of that school (so-called Chicago economics) is that it relied on abstract theorizing about how the economy functioned and had no understanding of what people actually do. That is, their perception of reality was generated by their theories, rather than the other way around.
This by way of introduction to a short post on the outraged produced in your humble Pannonian by this morning’s reading. It’s a rainy day here in Iglooville, and since Keyser at a piece of cake last night, he decided to burn 1000 calories on the stationary bike in atonement. What better means of diverting himself during this exercise than reading State Banking in Early America by Howard Bodenhorn. The B-meister turns out to be an “Associate Professor in the Department of Economics and Business at Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania. He has also taught atSt. Lawrence University in Canton, New York” (as the dust jacket informs us). It’s a bad sign if your institution is so obscure that the reader has to be informed where exactly it’s located. Still, the book is put out by Oxford University Press, so one might hope that it’s academically respectable.
Sadly, that’s probably true, given how ridiculous just the first few pages of analysis is. We start with an analysis of the bribery needed to get a charter for your bank in the early nineteenth century. Back then, all companies need a specific charter from the local state legislature, which at best involved partisan politics and at worst necessitated a large amount of bribery (either direct via funneling cash or favors to legislators or indirect by guaranteeing some sort of monetary compensation to the state treasury). This bribery was worthwhile because the restriction of banking to holders of charters allowed them to charge what the economists refer to as “rent.” Just as someone who monopolizes a piece of property by owning can exact money from anyone else who wants to use it via charging “rent,” in the broader economic sense anyone who has a legal monopoly on something can exact a surplus charge from anyone who wants to use it (just ask the Arabs about the “rent” they get from their position of the places where ancient organic material would pile up and get converted over the millennia into petroleum). So basically, having the monopolistic (or oligopolistic) right to engage in banking means you can skim some extra off from the charges for your services since if people want to borrow money, they can only go to the holders of the state-granted charters.
So, how do we analyze the economics of this bribery and its effect on society as a whole:
In the limiting case, rent seeking costs could be substantial. [I.e., if banking is restricted as outlined above, you'd have to spend a lot of money to get a charter.] If, for example, a group of prospective bankers believed that the discounted net present value of the stream of monopoly profits from banking was $1 million, each applicant would have invested an amount marginally less than the product of the probability of receiving the monopoly grant and the discounted stream of monopoly rents in obtaining a charter. If there were ten applicants, each with an equal probability of obtaining a charter, each would spend $100,000, and the expected monopoly rents would be completely expended in the race to obtain the property rights.
Clearly, the winner benefited because he spent only $100,000 to get the rights expected to be $1 million, but the players as a group spent $1 million to obtain $1 million. Society was no better off because the the expected net social return was zero.
This analysis is start-staring mad, bearing absolutely “zero” resemblance to historical reality. Let’s start with false premises. Where would this figure of $1 million in future revenue come from? How could anyone have known the circumstances of the distant future? Over what period of time? How could they have known whether the charter would be revoked or another granted to another bank? Might the bank go bust, and when? Would the charter applicant/briber die of appendicitis tomorrow? Even if it were theoretically possible to figure out the future income, how much would be applicant discount the present value of future earnings? Clearly, while a specific figure for future earnings is theoretically possible, it’s very difficult to determine what it would be for any individual. And there is not the least historical indication that anyone actually did think along such lines.
In any event, we take this putative figure and then divide it equally among out ten applicants. This seems to presuppose that the situation was an auction, where all applicants have an equal shot at a single charter. But in fact what you have is multiple, separate applicants, each with their own distinct proposal, which would be adjudicated separately from the rest. So the notion that they’re all equal and would have been evaluated on an equal basis is another ahistorical premise.
But even if it were like an auction, that doesn’t mean that the applicants reached joined decisions via some sort of open organization like the “bank applicants for charter X business group,” so that they could pool information about each other’s activities and costs. The idea seems to be that “bidding” on the charter is like the interaction of offers and acceptances on a commodities exchange. That may well be how the price of a bushel of wheat is determined, but has nothing to do with how much each applicant would spend on the costs of attaining a charter. Nobody said to himself and his rivals, “Okay, this thing’s worth $1 million and they’re are ten of us trying to get it, so it would be nuts for the ten of us to spend more than $1 million in aggregate for the thing. So, what say we agree to spend no more than $100,000 each?” Surely, everyone made his own determination of how much he could afford without consideration of other people’s spending (except conceivably to determine that it wasn’t worth his while to spend anything because somebody else had much deeper pockets and so it would be a waste to spend much of anything).
But the real kicker comes from the conclusion that under this scenario, “the players as a group spent $1 million to obtain $1 million. Society was no better off because the the expected net social return was zero.” Apart from the fact that there is absolutely no reason to imagine that the amount spent on aggregrate in bribery equaled and did not exceed some putative sum of expected future “rent” to be derived from the banking monopoly conferred by the charter, how could anyone conceive of this transaction as being a “social return”? We’re talking about a group of investors bribing the state legislator (in one way or other) to give them a monopoly that allows them to fleece the public. Who in his right mind would characterize this as a benefit to society?
So we have a conception that is completely divorced from practical or historical reality being analyzed abstractly as if a form of state-mandated theft is of benefit to society as a whole. Only a madman would think along these lines.
And it gets worse. The author goes on to discuss how early charters tried to undermine control of banks by wealthy individuals by watering down the voting rights of large shareholders. For instance, the first five shares owned by an individual would give that person five votes, but after that each block of five granted only one additional vote (there were lots of variants on such schemes). The author notes that such practices “reduced incentives to monitor managerial behavior” (not entirely sure why that should be), and then states that “it is possible that legislators weighed these incentives and developed voting schemes that, they believed, would equalize the cost at the margin.”
Well, yes, that is possible. It’s also possible that early legislators were actually alien impostors sent as spies by a sinister civilization that lurks somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy and has evil intentions about our lovely green planet, but until such time as there is evidence to this effect, we have no warrant to believe anything of the kind. Basically, our author’s understanding of the world is so clouded by his abstract theorizing that he know believes it possible that the Jeffersonian and Federalist legislators who were squabbling with each other in a most unseemly manner while taking bribes from bank applicants were determining their votes on the basis of some sort of wacky economist’s theory about equalizing costs at the margin, which they’d never heard of and could just as well have been an intercepted communication from that planet in the Andromeda Galaxy for all the sense it would have made to them if they had heard of it.
Human agents in the past could hardly have acted on the basis of modern theories they didn’t know, and for that matter, there is no reason to believe that present-day human agents in the economy act this way, either. But economists cook up these theories to explain how the worldshould that way, and then interpret the world on the completely unjustified premise that it does work that way.
One last bit of craziness from this book before Keyser completely loses it himself. One of the constant problems of early American banks was their lack of proper capitalization. That is, the share holders were supposed to kick in “real” money or “specie” (that is, gold) for the bank to start its business with, but frequently banks started before the full sum was paid in, or the capital consisted of defective forms of money (e.g., undervalued banknotes or depreciated government securities – items that weren’t actually worth the amount that the shareholder was obliged to contribute), or worst of all was eventually paid in through loans given to the shareholder by the bank itself. In effect, the so-called capital was actually “generated” by the bank’s own lending, which in effect meant that the bank was a fraud, lending out money it doesn’t have. (Say, when you think about, this isn’t a problem of only early banks, but that’s a different story.)
After describing this situation, the author cites a pair of earlier academics, who praised this use of “stock notes” (that is to say, loans made by the bank against its own stock as a way of creating its own capital) as an example of practicality. He concludes:
If Americans had allowed the chronic shortage of capital and specie to impede the formation of banks, the circle of capital shortages and underdevelopment observed in so many other places would have operated in the United States. The pretense of paying capital was forgivable because it inited baking services that stimulated trade and growth.
And there you have the madness of modern economic (Krumaniacal) theory. It’s okay to pretend that banks have money when they actually don’t, because lending out money that you don’t have “stimulates” the economy and causes growth.
Once again we have the fundamental error of confusing money and wealth. Buying stuff with fistfuls of paper money that’s been created out of nothing by banks does lead to production – in the short term. But any investment in productive capacity that is encouraged by such purchasing is a mirage, since there isn’t the actual accumulation of surplus wealth to justify the production.
And it’s precisely this sort of thinking that would lead to financial disasters like the great panic of 1837. Or 1929 for that matter. Simply wishing that there was more capital available than was in fact the case because that’s what we’d prefer is the way that children think. You shouldn’t be getting a PhD in Tooth Fairy Studies!
And it’s not just the past that’s at issue. The present economic crisis was caused fundamentally by the same fallacy that you can play games with money to make it look as if you have more wealth than you do. And the “remedies” of people like Bernanke and Geithner is to extend this game, creating more charades through the invention of trillions of dollars for the benefit of Wall Street by the Fed and the borrowing of vast sums of money (ultimately from the Fed as well) by the US Treasury.
While it may be that there will be some restraint on this gutter-variety quasi-Keynesianism as a result of the fall elections, so long as the underlying premises that are illustrated in this book and carried out in practice by the geniuses in Washington, the debt juggernaut will keep chugging along. Until it collapses under its own weight, which will not be a pretty sight.
Know Thy Enemy: Federal Reserve Edition
Posted by: | CommentsKeyser’s been a bit mum on economic topics recently. It’s not that he hasn’t been paying attention. Far from it. But there isn’t much news in this analysis. Basically, the Fed and the US Treasury have spent trillions of dollars that don’t signify anything real, and this “money” has resulted in a lot of institutions that are fundamentally bankrupt from not going out of business. Sounds great, no? Well, that’s the problem. It sounds good, but it isn’t. And most so-called economists don’t even understand reality.
Here’s an example of people’s non-comprehending frame of mind:
Stocks rose Monday as investors avoided big bets before the Federal Reserve’s meeting this week.
The Dow Jones industrial average gained 42 points in midday trading. Broader indexes had modest gains.
Investors are waiting for the Fed’s latest assessment of the economy that will be issued at the close of the central bank’s meeting on Tuesday. They also want to know if the Fed will restart some of its stimulus programs to help the recovery regain momentum.
The market’s growing concern about the economy has added to the importance of the Fed meeting. Recent economic reports have shown that the recovery is slowing. And Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke just a few weeks ago said the forecast for the recovery remains “unusually uncertain.”The Fed will likely leave its federal funds rate near zero, but the central bank could signal plans to restart some stimulus programs, such as its purchase of mortgage-backed securities. Those programs ended earlier this year when it appeared the recovery was proceeding well.
“The Fed has a lot of tools in its tool shed,” said Larry Rosenthal, president of Financial Planning Services in Manassas, Va. “They have to bring buyers back into the market; they have to bring consumption back into the market.”
“Have to bring consumption back into the market.” This is like a child imploring Santa to bring nice presents for Christmas. Sounds nice, but that’s not how the real world works. In this instance, the child wants Santa Bernanke to get people to buy stuff they can’t afford with made-up dollars that they borrow, ultimately, from the Fed.
The Federal Reserve is hold-over from the “Progressive Era,” the first decade or so of the last century before the start of the First World War. Basically, a bunch of smart people decided that the laissez-faire economy of the nineteenth-century was anarchic and dysfunctional, and everything would work a whole lot better, if only smart-asses with degrees from Harvard were allowed to “manage” things “rationally.” The consummate example of this line of thinking was the Soviet Union. Turns out that in practice it wasn’t so easy for the geniuses in Moscow to figure out how many, say, paper clips should be made in a given year. And indeed, without the feed back of prices determined freely in an open market, they couldn’t figure out the “right” amount of anything.
But somehow, the notion persists that a pack of idiots like Bernie Bernanke can get together every few months and figure out the value of the single most important commodity in a modern economy: money. To understand the full madness of this, we need a bit of background.
Everybody uses money, but most people don’t really understand what it is. Money is a commodity. That is, it’s something useful, like a bushel of wheat or a barrel of oil. But instead being an actual useful item, it’s seem a unit of account that can be instantly converted into a specific commodity at will. In effect, it’s a claim on a commodity, and it’s reality derives from the fact that it’s not a specific commodity. As the old example goes, if you make a shoe but need a hammer, the shoe doesn’t do you much good unless you can find someone with a hammer on offer who happens to need a shoe. Not too likely, right? But if you can exchange the shoe to someone who needs one and has something valuable like gold to give in return, then you can take the valuable stuff and use it to get the hammer. The step of converting “valuable stuff” to money is when it’s made into a fixed quantity in the form of a coin. This “money” with its fixed units then has a lot of ancillary functions, like allowing you to compare value via prices and to store value over time.
Until the 1930s, the US dollar was a fixed amount of gold. In 1933, Franklin Roosevelt confiscated the freely available monetary gold. The dollars then issued by the Federal Reserve had a theoretical connection to gold, but this was ended in 1971, when the French tried to turn in their dollars for gold, and since there were more dollars than gold, the US government was forced to end the pretense. The dollar is now nothing but a number of “units” that have no external value apart from people’s willingness to accept them in return for stuff like hammers.
Now, here’s where things get a bit complicated. Money is of worth only to the extent that it represents a certain amount of value. That is, a dollar is of value only because it can buy something, and has no inherent worth of its own. Substantive value that has been converted into money for the purpose of investment is called capital.
Money has existed for something like 2500 hundred years, since around 500 BC when the Lydian kings started marking lumps of electrum (a natural alloy of gold and silver) and thereby discovered coinage. But the extensive use of money to invest is not much more than 500 years old. Back in antiquity, if you had money to invest, you had to purchase something with it. If you had a lot, you could buy a business venture, but you had to run it (directly or indirectly). There were no paper investments. That is, you couldn’t buy a piece of paper giving you a fractional share of the profits in some fixed organization in return for giving it the funds to operate with. That’s why today we occasionally find thousands of ancient coins buried in the ground. There was no other way to save value in abstract form.
For some hundreds of years, it’s been possible to invest your money abstractly by providing economic organizations (“companies”) with the “capital” they need. The so-called capitalist system involves the wide-spread practice of using money to invest without having to have any direct role in the investment. While some would equate the capitalist system with a free-market system, the two are actually two distinct notions. One can certainly have capitalism without free markets. That’s true even of most highly-regulated Western economies, and when you get down to it, the so-called communist system is simply capitalism entirely regulated and owned by the state. And the Federal Reserve’s control of the money supply fits in much more easily in a communistic system than a free-market one.
Maybe you don’t want to make a specific investment. Instead, you want to keep your “invested” money in as “liquid” a form as possible. And “liquid” means convertible into cash at will. So instead of buying a share in a company or a bond issued by a company or the government, you choose to lend the money as such. In this sort of transaction, you give someone else money to use for whatever he wants, and the receiver of the money pays you “rent” for the money. But instead of calling it “rent” we call it “interest.” Since money takes the form of monetary denominations, it’s easy to calculate the “rent” as a given percentage of the total loan per period of time.
What then is the interest rate? In a free market, it’s the amount of rent that can be charged for borrowing the available money. And what is money? As indicated before, it’s basically just a claim on value in terms of the prices for goods determined by the free market. In effect, borrowing money is way of acquiring the right to enter into that market with the claim on value you have in the form of money.
Proper interest rates than are simply a pricing mechanism on the worth of liquid capital. And capital becomes available because people forgo either keeping their money in the form of money or using that money themselves to buy stuff (which is known as consumption). Real capital is then made available through two processes: consumption and the desire to lend the money out to someone else in return for interest. If not much capital is available in this way for borrowing, then the rate of interest that the market will bear rises.
High interest rates then have two effects. First, it discourages the borrowing of “expensive” money. Why is this good? Because the refusal of people to save and lend means that the capital available for investment is restricted, and so people shouldn’t be making use of loaned money for the purpose of, say, expanding their business, because there isn’t the excess capital to support such activity. The second result is that because there’s a high rate of return, people will be encouraged to save money and to lend it out for interest, which in turn increases the available capital. Interest rates will then fall as more money (“capital”) is made available, and in turn more people will be encouraged to borrow for investment.
Eventually, the supply of increasingly available capital and increasing borrowing will reach natural equilibrium. Conversely, if interest rates are too low, people will be discouraged from borrowing, and rates will rise, with a corresponding reduction in borrowing. That’s how the system is supposed to work.
But that’s not how people like it to function. Back in the late nineteenth century, bankers used to bitch about the “inelasticity” of the money supply. At harvest time in the fall, farmers would take out a lot of their bank savings in the form of cash to pay their workers and pay for the transport of their crops to market. This would lead rural banks to withdraw balances that they would otherwise keep in larger cities, and this compounding process of withdrawal would have the most magnified effect in the financial capital of the country in New York City, where the big bankers had been lending these deposits out for speculation. Somehow, bankers were too stupid to predict the fall harvest, and they repeatedly had troubles caused by the fall withdrawals, culminating in the crisis of 1907. The upshot was the creation of the Federal Reserve Bank, as a banker’s bank whose supposed purpose was to alleviate these purposed crises caused by seasonal fluctuations in the money supply.
In the first place, the whole purpose of interest rates is to reflect the availability of capital. If Mr. Haney is taking his money back to pay the farm hands, then J. Pierpont Morgan should be subject to higher interest rates. And if some idiots have gotten themselves in trouble by borrowing money to speculate in stock and now can’t pay it back, too fucking bad, dumbass. You shoulda looked at the calendar, moron.
But no. God forbid anything should stand in the way of New York speculators. So let’s cook up the Federal Reserve as a way to provide bucks to our worthy NYC speculators by making up money to pretend that capital is available when it isn’t until real capital reemerges when the farmers start banking their surpluses again. So they created the Fed in 1913.
It took ‘em a while to figure out the full potential of their diabolical powers. Somehow or other, the Fed has decide it has the right to buy $1.75 trillion worth of bad debts from banks. Now that one’s an eye opener, but its deleterious effects are basically passive. It means that the big banks like Citigroup and Bank of America can pretend they’re solvent when they aren’t. Now of course there is harm caused by this. In effect, the loser banks can acquire cash more cheaply than they deserve because lenders believe (probably rightly) that the “too big to fail” policy means that even if the big banks do stupid things with that money, the government will bail them out. And the ability to borrow money cheaply gives the big banks an advantage over the smaller banks that a) weren’t so foolhardy in the first place and b) can’t count of a Timmy/Bernie bail out. But that’s small change.
The Fed has the ability to manipulate the interest rate for the whole country (by making up money for banks and putting money in circulation through buying government bonds, among other ploys). Why anyone thinks this is a good idea is a beyond Keyser. The theory is that in times of expansion, the Fed will put the brake on excess by increasing interest rates, and in times of trouble, it will encourage consumption via low rates. So how’s that turned out?
Clearly, the Fed and its low interest rates have led to a massive expansion in prices since the ’50s as a result of a constant expansion of credit. In effect, the Fed is always inclined to have low interest rates, either to keep the good times rolling or to pump them up again in recessions. As we all know, low interest rates in the years following the bursting of the dot com bubble in 2000 resulted in the massive real estate bubble that burst in 2007 and caused the financial meltdown in 2008. And what’s the prescription for this problem? Why, low interest rates of course.
The point being to get people to borrow more money to buy shit they can’t afford, and in the process reinflate the price of housing to bail out the banks stuck with millions of mortgages on houses whose current market value can’t cover the loans taken out to buy them.
But this is insanity. As any dimwit should be able to predict, low interest rates discourage savings, and in the absence of actual capital behind it, lending for its own sake with made-up money is entirely deleterious. In the first place, the Fed has no control of what anyone does with the borrowed money. Since economic prospects aren’t good, many businesses and people aren’t so inclined to borrow and in any case, banks are now being stingy with lending. So that means that the cheap money provided by the Fed is borrowed to speculate (hello, stock market run up since March of last year!). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the whole purpose of interest rates is to give people feedback about the availability of capital. That is, low interest rates should tell economic agents that savings is making excess capital available for investment in things like more production. But we’ve already seen that the low rates are having the exact opposite effect on savings, and true economic state is that there’s excess capacity, so investment is counterproductive.
You know, in a show last night, there was talk about who the worst presidents were, and the name Warren G. Harding came up. Now, it may be true that he had some losers in his cabinet. But he was also responsible for the Great Depression of 1920. Oh, wait a minute. No, he wasn’t. Harding was the last president whose attitude was “not my problem.” Prices had become inflated during the big borrowing to pay for the First World War, and there was a major retraction in 1920 as prices began to tumble. Instead of trying to reflate prices, Harding let things go. The imprudent and improvident went bust, there was high unemployment for a year and a half, and then… It was all over, and the boom of the ’20s started. Of course, there was another inflation in the later ’20s, and when that one went bust in 1929, the “modern” period of economic intervention started. With all the deleterious consequences of government intervention, and other Keynesian nonsense.
You’d think by now that the manifest failure of the Fed and the parallel policies in the Federal government should be clear by now. Yet idiots like Bernanke and Geithner are listened to as if they weren’t responsible for the disaster we’re in in the first place. Interest rates are the most basic of signals for a free market, conveying to investors the availability of capital. They shouldn’t be manipulated at will by a pack of pseudo-experts, who have a large number of abstract theories of how the world works and little or no understanding of its fundamental principles. People like this are so deluded by their own misconceptions that they can actually argue that because they have no more ability to lower interest rates since they’re pretty close to zero already, it’s advisable to induce a higher regular inflation rate, so that they’ll have more “wiggle room” to keep lower rates (can’t find the link, but some lunatic proposed this last year). That’s like saying that because the fever-reducing medicine that you’ve prescribed isn’t bringing down the fever much, the patient’s body should be made to have a persistent low-grade fever to improve the effectiveness of the drug. That’s entirely back to front, but fully in keeping with the idea that the Fed should apply its delicate touch to the level of interest rates on the grounds that its board knows best.
Surely, it should be clear enough by now that the Federal Reserve board, and virtually all economists for that matter, have little idea of even what’s gone on and what’s happening now, much less what’s going to happen. And the idea that they can manipulate interest rates in helpful manner is thoroughly laughable.
Emulate Warren G. Harding, the president least known for solving an economic problem, because his lack of action forestalled a far worse downturn than the one that resulted from letting the system work out the problem on its own. A bit less 1900s progressive arrogance and a bit more 19-century laissez faire is what’s called for. No doubt Goldman Sachs and Citigroup and some other “big boys” wouldn’t exist. So what?
But today’s economists and politicians can never leave well enough alone. Because they know better…
Into Every Life a Little Shit Must Dance…
Posted by: | CommentsDid your mother ever tell about the dangers of playing in traffic? Well, seemingly this guy’s didn’t.
The way the guy taking the video says “Oh, shit…” at the end as if he had to ruminate on the implications of what he’d just seen is priceless.
Assuming our little dancer survived, what do you think his next “Stupid Human Trick” will be to prolong (if that’s the right word) his fifteen seconds of fame?
Plagiarism: The Fun Way!
Posted by: | CommentsThe topic of the widespread indulgence in plagiarism among today’s students is a frequent topic of conversation here at Casa Söze. Keyser doesn’t come across it much (he doesn’t teach much in the way of basic intro courses, and his daemonology course is structured in such a way that the demons fink if any students try out someone else’s spells), but Mrs. S. teaches all sorts of intro courses and has quite a bee in her bonnet about “nailing those fuckers” when she catches them (she takes it rather personally: “what kind of idiot do they take me for?”). There’s many a tale could be told on that topic, but the strict secrecy of Igloo U. procedures precludes recounting incidents like the one where Mrs. S. caught one of the little turds using the “Sparks Notes” (or some such thing) synopsis of Statius’ Thebaid (or some such thing), and after going through all the rigmarole to draw up the letter of denunciation to the demon dean in charge of burning alive dealing with cheating students, she came across another paper and thought to herself, “Hmm. Now, I’ve heard this before somewhere…” Busted! The second ‘tard had plagiarized exactly the same material.
Anyway, all this by way of introduction to the latest method of plagiarism that Keyser just came across. It would seem that there are more interesting ways of cheating on your paper than just cutting and pasting from the Interwebz. Get this (as it were):
Lady Gaga tells Vanity Fair contributing editor Lisa Robinson that she tries to avoid having sex because she is afraid of depleting her creative energy—“I have this weird thing that if I sleep with someone they’re going to take my creativity from me through my vagina.”
First off, it would seem that Lady G cheated her way through freshman comp. At any rate, there’s seems to be some sort of gap in the thought here. Presumably, she meant to say, “this weird thing that if I sleep with someone, I fear that they’re going…”
Anyway, whatever the failings in the mode of expression, the thought seems clear enough. This method of stealing someone else’s ideas brings to mind a few parallels in earlier magical practice.
In the primitive days of ancient Rome, there was a provision in the law code known as the Twelve Tables that made it illegal to steal the fertility of your neighbor’s fields through incantation. A funny anecdote tells of someone who was accused of doing precisely this, and in his trial before the Roman People he said, “Yeah, sure, I used magic to make my fields so fertile, and here are my magical instruments,” whereupon he had his slaves bring in well cared-for agricultural implements. Take that, lazy, envious neighbors!
As a variant of this procedure, it was thought in the early modern period that you could stick a knife into a post in your barn, and then if you said the right formula and pretended to milk the knife, a demon would steal the milk from your neighbor’s cows and stick it in yours.
Well, the good lady seems to have a more direct method in mind. Instead of sticking the knife in a post, you stick directly in her own “source of fertility” and then you can suck the plenty right out of her yourself! Sounds like a lot more fun, in theory at any rate.
Now, Gaga may not be exactly to everyone’s taste, but Keyser could see picking up a few ideas from here (as it were) if the image above is anything to judge by.
But what if you want to be, say, a CanLit novelist?
Yikes! Keyser would rather face the demon in charge of cheating students!
Blast from the Past: Lending to Losers Edition
Posted by: | CommentsYou know, Keyser has a strong sense of when the impending financial debacle in the US that was caused (in part at any rate) by giving away mind-boggling sums of money in mortgages to people without sufficient means to repay the money. Keyser and Mrs. S. were going for a walk along a street here in Iglooland, and there was a sign painted on the back of a bench at a bus stop. The sign said something to the effect of “Bad credit? No one else will give you a car loan? Then call us! [phone number]” Keyser turned to Mrs. S. and said, “Apparently, that’s what they’re doing all over the place in the US. Seems to Keyser that it’s a self-evidently bad idea to give loans to people with bad credit. There must be a reason why they can’t money from anyone else.” That would have been the summer of 2007. That December, Keyser was in Chicago to get an award (for his magnum opus in daemonology, and he and Mrs. S. dropped in on the guys who were (mis)managing Keyser’s little sum of money that he got from Keyser Sr.’s life insurance after Satan finally claimed his due. Well. There were already deep rumblings, and Keyser actually alluded to this advertisement that he saw. Keyser said, “Okay, guys. Keyser’s in this for the long haul. If you think these problems are transient, he’s willing to ride things out.” We all know how that one turned out. If those idiots had dumped Fannie Mae, AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo back then, Keyser would be in much better shape (instead of being a poster child for the “thanks for the money, sucka!” PR campaign that Wall Street has put out.
Anyhoo, this just a bit of background for a little piece of humor that tickled Keyser’s sardonia bone courtesy of that subsidiary of the US Treasury, General Motors:
General Motors said on Thursday that it had agreed to buy a financing company, AmeriCredit, for $3.5 billion so it can lease more vehicles and increase sales to consumers with lower credit ratings [note that the term "subprime lender" is used in the title to the story].
The transaction, expected to close in the fourth quarter, gives G.M. a captive financing arm for the first time since 2007, when it sold control of GMAC Financial Services. G.M. recently considered starting a new financing arm or reacquiring GMAC, now known as Ally Financial, to strengthen its lending capabilities and to raise the carmaker’s value ahead of a public stock offering.
“Our dealers have been telling us that not having an in-house finance arm hurt our ability to finance certain loans and leases,” Edward E. Whitacre Jr., G.M.’s chief executive, said in a conference call. “It hurt our ability to meet rising customer demand for G.M. cars and trucks. Now we’re going to fix that.”
Well, there you go. What better “fix” to the problem of not being able to sell enough product than lending money to people who can’t afford your product and will eventually default on your loans? As a wise man once said, “it’s a self-evidently bad idea to give loans to people with bad credit.” Then again, if you get big bonuses from selling product and the risk of default is picked up by someone else (like the US Treasury and its friends in the PRC), then it probably sounds like a nice gig.
What could go wrong?
So, here’s a bit of investment advice. Rule Number One: Don’t let idiots handle your money. Rule Number Two: Don’t let idiots handle your money. Rule Number Three: Don’t let idiots handle your money. If you follow these three simple rules, you can never go wrong!











